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In 1988 we initiated our work on belief data.  The work proceeded in two phases: in the first 
phase we formalized the concept of error in everyday record keeping, and in the second phase we 
considered multilevel security.  The purpose of this report is to create an awareness about our 
works on belief data and to serve as a guide for the following manuscripts.1  The first two manu-
scripts are on the concept of errors, and the latter three are on multilevel security. Except 
[TR97-17], all manuscripts are in their original form.  
[TR97-14] Gadia, Shashi K. and Gautam Bhargava.  A formal treatment of errors and updates in a rela-
tional database. 1988-89.  [45 scanned pages; the file size is about 3.4 MBytes]
[TR97-15] Bhargava, Gautam and Shashi K. Gadia.  The concept of error in a database: An application of 
temporal databases.  1989-90. [16 scanned pages; the file size is about 1.0 MBytes.]
[TR97-16] Tsz Shing Cheng and Shashi K. Gadia.  An algebra for belief persistence in multilevel security. 
1995.  [20 pages; 105 KBytes]
[TR97-17] Gadia, Shashi K.  Applicability of temporal data models to query multilevel security data-
bases: a case study.  1995-97.  [20 pages; 85 KBytes]
[TR97-18] Tsz Shing Cheng and Shashi K. Gadia.  An algebra for belief persistence in multilevel security.  
A revised version of [TR97-16] incorporating some findings from [TR97-16]. 1996.  [20 
pages; 95 KBytes]
1. Concept of error in a database [TR97-14,TR97-15]
The purpose of an update operation is to alter a value, e.g., the salary of an employee, in a data-
base.  The need to alter a value arises in two different contexts: first, when a value changes in the 
real world (e.g., when an employee gets a salary raise); and second, when it is learned that the 
knowledge (belief) about the salary was incorrectly recorded in the database.  [TR97-14,TR97-15] 
present a model to elevate this problem.  This model gives a formal definition and query language 
for the concept of error in a  database.  It turns out that this is a non-trivial exercise:
1. [TR97-14] and [TR97-15] were a part of the work that Gautam Bhargava and I did toward Gautam’s 
Ph.D. dissertation.  The thesis was also published as a technical report TR89-24 by our department.  [TR97-
15] appeared in 1990 COMAD International Conference on Management of Data.  The proceedings of that 
conference were published in the book Data Management: Current Trends, edited by Naveen Prakash, pub-
lished by Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, New Delhi.  A brief treatment also appeared in the book 
Temporal Databases: Theory, Design, and Implementation, edited by Tansel et. al., Benjamin-Cummings, 
1993.  [TR97-17] is expected to appear in a forthcoming book.   
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• The concept of error must allow for transition: a value believed to be correct today may be con-
sidered in error tomorrow, and yet the after tomorrow the original value may again be believed 
to be correct.  
• Correct and incorrect values reside in the same database.  When algebraic operations are per-
formed, incorrect values can assume the role of identity and corrupt information. 
• Even key values (e.g., name of an employee) may need correcting, yet the value based identity 
of an object must persist beyond corrections. 
The model in [TR97-14,TR97-15] introduces the concept of anchor.  An anchor is the correct 
value under a given belief.  The entire database is anchored before it is queried.  An anchor is 
read-only, that is, it cannot be deleted by the user.  The anchoring is done automatically by the 
system; the anchor cannot be destroyed by the algebraic operators, and it keeps the information 
meaningful during query evaluation.  
2. Multilevel security [TR97-16,TR97-17,TR97-18]
Multilevel security is a hierarchical system for beliefs.  In a hierarchy of users, the upper users 
own information not available to lower users.  In a multilevel security database, a multiplicity of 
varying beliefs about a real world object exists at the same time.  
2.1. The problem of covert channel
In the multilevel security literature it has been pointed out that the classical model is not capa-
ble of handling multilevel security data.  As an example, suppose that an upper user has some 
information about an employee named John.  By hypothesis, in multilevel security neither this 
information nor its existence is known to a lower user.  Now suppose the lower user learns some 
information about some other employee, also named John, and tries to add a tuple containing that 
information to the database.  Then the system will reject the insertion complaining that John’s 
tuple already exists in the database.  From this message, the lower employee might conclude that 
some upper user knows John.  This is violation of security, in fact a very serious one.  It can be 
shown that this has the potential of setting up a covert channel between the two users by which 
the upper user can leak information (an arbitrary sequences of bits 0 and 1) to the lower user. 
2.2. Solution: polyinstantiation
It should be clear now that one must be able to maintain multiple instantiations (termed polyin-
stantiation) of a value in a multilevel security database.  In current multilevel security literature, 
polyinstantiation is typically incorporated by adding a USER column to a relation.  Thus, in an 
employee relation the two attributes NAME USER form the key instead of the single attribute USER.  
This security problem is thereby eliminated.     
Polyinstantiation is not new to database.  In temporal and spatial databases, the concept of time 
or space is incorporated either by adding a time or a space column at the tuple level or incorpo-
rated at the attribute level.  For example, starting with a temporal database model and rewording 
the term “instant” to “user level”  one immediately obtains the core of a model for multilevel 
security.  Therefore, in a mathematical sense, polyinstantiation exists a priori in all temporal and 
spatial data models.  It turns out that there is no hand-waving in this argument, [TR97-17] deals 
specifically with this point and it makes a detailed comparison between a model in multilevel 
security and a multilevel security model tailored from a temporal model.  
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2.3. Polyinstantiation and key attributes
All models in multilevel security literature seem to be conceived under the assumption that the 
key attributes of an object do not vary from one level to another.  This is a very strong assumption; 
yet, it is also important to subject even key attributes in multilevel security to variations in beliefs.  
In other words, just as nonkey attributes are polyinstantiated, so should be key attributes as well.  
Belief-based model for errors in [TR97-14,TR97-15] introduced the concept of polyinstantiation 
for key attributes.  The manuscripts [TR97-16] and [TR97-18] achieved polyinstantiation of key 
attributes in multilevel security databases.  
3. Reading guide
The manuscripts offer an argument against 1nf modeling of belief data.  Although the frame-
work may at first seem overwhelming, the light at the end of the tunnel may well be a user-
friendly, reliable query language.  Here are some useful hints:
• If the reader is only interested in the concept of errors, he/she should read [TR97-15] before 
reading [TR97-14].  [TR97-14], which is written in a very formal style, goes over and beyond 
[TR97-15].  
• If the reader has a casual curiosity about the relationship between temporal and multilevel secu-
rity databases, it is enough to read [TR97-17].
• If the reader is interested in reading about errors as well as about multilevel security, the best 
starting point is Section 3 in [TR97-18].  For a reasonable appreciation of errors and multilevel 
security, read [TR97-18] followed by [TR97-15].   For the most detailed understanding of these 
works all five manuscripts should be read in the following sequence: [TR97-17], [TR97-18], 
[TR97-16], [TR97-15] and [TR97-14].   
Comments about these manuscripts are appreciated.  We are aware of a partial error in our defi-
nition of the projection operator in [TR97-14,TR97-15].  If a reader discovers any additional errors, 
the authors will be grateful to be informed about them. 
